Nixon and Kissinger deliberate

Nixon and Kissinger deliberate on Air Force One

Preparations

President Nixon and Chairman Mao often took credit for ending the absurd standoff between their two countries, and they deserve it - but not all of it. Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 had taken three years to arrange, three years of delicate feelers, of careful signals sent out and usually but not always received, of indirect contacts, of intense internal debates, and, finally, of direct negotiations. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser, had made a secret trip to Beijing in the Summer of 1971 and then a public one in the autumn to prepare the way for a visit by Nixon himself.

Kissinger had discussed grand strategy with Chou En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, and, in sharp exchanges, the issues that still divided their countries. Kissinger and Chou had also discussed the details of Nixon's coming trip. Was the American president a supplicant, asking to come to China, or were the Chinese inviting him? Such questions matter in international relations, especially between two countries when each is convinced that it is the more important. Presidential visits always require detailed advance work, and China was unknown territory. Moreover, until all the details were worked out, there was always the danger that one side or the other would pull back.

The choice of the emissary was crucial. In their message that reached Washington on April 27, the Chinese had suggested that Kissinger himself might be Nixon's special envoy. Kissinger, understandably, longed to go. He had already sent a message telling the Chinese that it was "essential" that he be the first to meet Chou. Kissinger was right: he was the obvious choice. He knew Nixon's mind and had been involved in every stage of the secret negotiations. He was the mastermind behind the "triangular diplomacy" the Nixon administration had been practicing: slowly but surely, through subtle means of international diplomacy, breaking up China and the Soviet Union, so that advantageous deals might be separately negotiated with either power.

Though Nixon was reluctant to agree to Kissinger's request - he was already envious of the press coverage of Kissinger and of Kissinger's growing reputation as a smooth man about town - in the end he had little choice. "Reality", said Kissinger, "took care of this problem."

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