The Stakes

Fortunately for Kissinger and Nixon, their initiative remained secret. Both men, of course, were taking a great risk. Not only was Kissinger going off into the unknown, but he was taking a political risk as well. If he did not bring back concrete results from his meetings with Chou, his own position in Washington would be weakened and that of the State Department, which had warned all along about rushing precipitously into negotiations, would be enhanced.

In 1971 Nixon needed success, particularly in foreign policy, which he had always claimed as his own. He was already looking forward to the next presidential election, but his record so far was mixed: the war in Vietnam was grinding on and negotiations with the North Vietnamese were stalemated; Laos and Cambodia were slipping further under Communist influence; and the Soviet Union was being difficult. "We're playing for very high stakes now," Nixon had said to Kissinger the day he left. "We have very little time left, and we cannot diddle around."

Nixon gave Kissinger some last minute instructions, warning him against being so forthcoming. He should raise three specters with the Chinese: what he, Nixon, might do if the stalemate in South Vietnam continued, and the threats to China from Japan and the Soviet Union. If the Chinese wanted a summit with him, they would have to release all American POWs they still held, be helpful on Vietnam, and - this was to appeal to American farmers - accept some grain shipments from the United States. In return, Kissinger could suggest that, once the summit had been held, the United States would be happy to set up a hot line between Beijing and Washington and perhaps make an agreement on avoiding an accidental nuclear war.